

CHAPTER 4

NONTASK INTRINSIC MOTIVATION

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Introduction

Nontask intrinsic motivation – prompted by rewards not related to or contingent on specific tasks – describes much of the kind of motivation we associate with the military. This includes the “can do” attitude of doing “whatever it takes” to do the best job possible, no matter what that job is; and it explains how concepts like duty, service, patriotism, and idealism can motivate behaviors an organization values. Although theories relating these concepts to motivation are not new, recent interest has been generated by consideration of the Japanese work culture, which, like the military’s, is based on “the notion that the employee must act on the basis of responsibilities, obligations, duties, and moral imperatives that supersede her or his self-interest.”¹

As we have stated in earlier chapters, motivation may be broadly categorized as extrinsic or intrinsic, task-related or nontask-related. The source of intrinsic motivation is internal; it comes from within the individual rather than through some external vehicle, such as a paycheck. It is important to emphasize what we mean by the term “nontask” in this definition: *nontask* intrinsic motivation *results from* intrinsic rewards that are not contingent on specific achievements. “Nontask,” then, refers to the *source* of motivation rather than its *object* or goal. Thus, we may characterize nontask intrinsic motivation as underlying a general desire to exert effort in performing a job or in performing a task required by that job, regardless of what that task is. This type of motivation may derive from membership in an organization and the “psychic” rewards that accompany that membership, or it may come simply from an individual’s dedication to values or goals he or she shares with an organization.

One further caveat: there is no hard-and-fast definition of what is or is not nontask intrinsic motivation, nor is there a consistent terminology. Leonard, for example, talks about what she calls “expressive” behavior, “whether it is termed intrinsic motivation, intrinsically motivated behavior, moral involvement, or internalized motivation.”²

The first section of this chapter describes the need for self-based theories. The second describes some models of nontask intrinsic motivation that are related to the strength and nature of a person’s concept of “self.” The third section discusses applications to the military, including empirical support for the theories, policy implications, and a brief discussion of the military “X-factor.” We conclude with some general recommendations.

¹ Howard S. Schwartz, “A Theory of Deontic Work Motivation,” *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 14 (1983), p. 204.

² Nancy H. Leonard, Laura L. Beauvais, and Richard W. Scholl, “A Self-Concept Based Model of Work Motivation,” *Academy of Management Journal* (Iss. Best Paper Proceedings) (1995), p. 322.

The Need for Self-concept Based Theories

The job design models discussed in the last chapter help to explain task-related motivation, but those models do not account for all behaviors and motivations we observe in the workplace. Some behaviors transcend individual tasks, for example, and some motivation appears to have its source in the values that people hold and in their sense of moral obligation. According to Shamir, we need “theories that can explain individual sacrifices for collective concerns and can account for the role of values and moral obligations in energizing and directing work behavior.”³ A number of researchers conclude that such theories of work motivation must be based on the *self-concept*, an idea that encompasses the way people see themselves, what they would like to be, how they want others to see them, their internal value systems, and the relative strengths of these ideas.

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Behaviors

One set of behaviors that need explanation are those that occur or are observable only over time. Shamir offers “commitment” as an example; it is a “pattern of behavior” one can judge over time but not on the basis of any one action.⁴ Carlisle and Manning similarly stress the importance of “an enduring sense of obligation, as distinct from a transitory incentive to work in terms of an immediate reward,” given that “many organizational tasks are routine tasks.”⁵

Frank mentions the need to incorporate what he calls “nonegoistic” forms of behavior, such as *altruism*, into economic models of rational behavior and shows that the models produce different results when such behaviors are taken into account. Moreover, they correspond to what we see in the real world.⁶ Organ links organizational performance to what he calls “extra-role” forms of individual performance. These include, again, *altruism*, exemplified by helping a colleague with a specific problem, such as how to use the copier machine; *courtesy*, a preventive measure that diffuses potential interpersonal conflicts that could have negative effects on productivity; *sportsmanship*, characterized by restraint from taking actions that detract from the productivity of the workplace, such as arguments, complaints, grievances, outbursts of frustration; *civic virtue*, or doing the things that help the organization’s administration to run smoothly, such as reading one’s e-mail, attending meetings, and contributing by suggestion and participation in improving the workings of the organization; and, *conscientiousness*, characterized as conforming to the spirit of rules and policies rather than just to their letter.⁷

³ Boas Shamir, “Meaning, Self, and Motivation in Organizations,” *Organization Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1991), p. 410.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

⁵ Ysanne M. Carlisle and David J. Manning, “The Concept of Ideology and Work Motivation,” *Organization Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 5 (1994), p. 700.

⁶ Robert Frank, *Microeconomics and Behavior* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1994).

⁷ Dennis W. Organ and Thomas S. Bateman, *Organizational Behavior* (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1991).

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Personal Values

People tend to behave in ways consistent with their internal values. In Shamir's model, the congruence of people's actions with their values affects the way people view themselves (in terms of self-esteem or self-worth), and thereby influences their behavior.⁸ Carlisle and Manning argue that "ideological values are held by persons in employment disclosed in the form of an attitude towards their working life," and that the work motivation they inspire is bound up in values reflected in task performance and decision-making.⁹ Further, the congruence of individual and organizational values can affect achievement of organizational goals. A shared ideology imparts value to the "practices, procedures, and objectives of organizations," sustaining "motivational commitment" of its members.¹⁰

Moral Obligation

Among internal sources of motivation is what Leonard *et al.* call "moral involvement," which is "not based on expected satisfaction of needs and may even demand the denial of need satisfaction and the sacrifice of personal pleasure. For example, military personnel who serve in the armed forces demonstrate the value of serving one's country to the point of risking their lives."¹¹ Shamir observes that currently popular theories take no notice of the concept of an individual's moral obligations to a firm as a motivator of behavior,¹² but that Schwartz' theory of "deontic" motivation fills that gap. It also fits the military enterprise.

Schwartz' theory of work motivation takes its name from the Greek word for "duty" and suggests that the concept of "obligation" can help to explain work behavior.¹³ The crux of the theory is that people can be motivated to perform by a *self-imposed* sense of duty or obligation to the employer or organization. It differs from theories of work motivation underlying the work of researchers such as Hackman and Oldham or Deci in that it treats work as an obligation rather than as a potentially intrinsically motivating activity. While the Hackman-Oldham and Deci views result in suggestions of ways to improve the work environment so that workers will enjoy their jobs more, Schwartz' theory accepts that work is quite likely to consist of onerous duties imposed on the employee by his or her employer. The question is, "How is it possible to account for the feeling of being 'in control,' which we know to have profound motivational significance, with the fact that one's actions in organizational life are in fact, determined by some other agent?"¹⁴ Whereas Deci argues that the issue of autonomy versus control is central to motivation, with the implication that rewards are, by their nature, controlling, Schwartz shows that there is considerable

⁸ Shamir, pp. 405-424.

⁹ Carlisle and Manning, p. 701.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 701.

¹¹ Leonard *et al.*, p. 322.

¹² Shamir.

¹³ Schwartz.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 206.

historical support for the view that work obligation, when that sense of obligation comes from within the worker, can shed its “controlling” nature.¹⁵ That is, “autonomy” and “obligation” (or duty) are not necessarily inconsistent. The result is a theory that supports “the way in which obligation motivation inclines one toward activity that is socially useful, done for others and not for oneself.”¹⁶ Additionally, his theory implies that extrinsic rewards can contribute to deontic motivation, insofar as they create a sense of obligation on the part of the employee.

Theories and Models

We present here several models most applicable to the military context. First, however, we describe a comprehensive framework in which to place all theories of motivation (Sullivan’s “metatheory”). Then we will discuss the structure of Shamir’s “self-concept based” theory and another that fits well with it – Schein’s “career anchor” theory.

Work Motivation Metatheory

According to Sullivan, *all* theories of motivation fall under the broad heading of “self.” The “self” can then act in some situations and environments as an *agent*, and in others more as a *non-agent*, or *process*. This implies that under some conditions, “agency” or cognitive theories will best explain behavior, while under other conditions self-concept theories will be more predictive. The non-agency approaches are those that emphasize the importance of the self-concept under conditions when “the agency nature of self is muted and self-concept and its various processes are functioning.”¹⁷ When there is adequate information, stress is low, and tasks are familiar and important, the agency theories are appropriate in determining motivation. In these situations, for example, job design will be important in motivating behavior. On the other hand, when stress is high, the job’s importance is not clear, and information is inadequate, then the self-as-process takes over the job of providing motivation. In essence, under these latter conditions nontask intrinsic motivation will be important in motivating behavior and the employee “may be more prone to motivation through the manipulation of self-efficacy or job enrichment.”¹⁸ Table 4-1 shows Sullivan’s categorization of theories and corresponding sources of motivation.

¹⁵ He further shows that considerable existing research on the “Protestant Work Ethic” supports the view of the Protestant ethic as deontic motivation to work.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

¹⁷ Jerry J. Sullivan, “Self Theories and Employee Motivation,” *Journal of Management*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1989), p. 359.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

Table 4-1. Agency and Non-agency Approaches to Employee Motivation ¹⁹

AGENCY APPROACH	THEORY	MOTIVATION FOSTERED BY
	<i>Stable Self</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Maintenance of familiar environment × Consistent, expected task demands × Self-examination of personal identity
	<i>Economic Self</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Employee selection to match individual personality, expected effort, job tasks, and environment × Instrumental conditioning to maintain effort level
	<i>Developing Self</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Enhancing growth potential × Providing workplace autonomy
NON-AGENCY, CONSTRUCTED SELF (SELF-CONCEPT)		
APPROACH	THEORY	MOTIVATION FOSTERED BY
	<i>Self-reinforcement</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Praise, recognition, reward × Autonomy × Professionalizing × Communal team building
	<i>Job Enrichment</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Selection of high growth need individuals × Varied, meaningful tasks × Autonomy
	<i>Self-efficacy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Employee selection of high self-efficacy individuals
	<i>Self-esteem</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × High managerial expectations
	<i>Intrinsic Motivation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Interesting, involving, challenging tasks × Autonomy
	<i>Self-schemata</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> × Employee selection of aschematics × If schematic, fostering development of ideal and public selves

The applicability of a particular theory depends upon the degree of “activation” of the self. Although the degree of “activation” varies over a continuum, Table 4-2 shows the conditions that will tend to lead to relatively high or low self-activation and will therefore make some theories more relevant than others.

¹⁹ Sullivan, p. 346.

Table 4-2. A Model of Environment, Self-activation Level, and Relevant Employee Motivation Theories ²⁰

ORGANIZATIONAL AND TASK ENVIRONMENT	SELF-ACTIVATION LEVEL	SOURCE OF MOTIVATION	RELEVANT EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION THEORIES
<i>Familiar Low Uncertainty Low Stress High Significance</i>	<i>High Activation</i>	<i>Self as Agent</i>	× <i>Economic Theory</i> × <i>Need Theories</i> × <i>Balance Theories</i> × <i>Equity Theory</i> × <i>Expectancy Theory</i>
<i>Unfamiliar High Uncertainty High Stress Low Significance</i>	<i>Low Activation</i>	<i>Self as Process</i>	× <i>Self-reinforcement</i> × <i>Self-schemata</i> × <i>Self-efficacy</i> × <i>Self-esteem</i> × <i>Impression Management</i> × <i>Goal-setting</i> × <i>Job Enrichment</i> × <i>Intrinsic Motivation</i>

Self-concept Based Theory of Work Motivation

Shamir bases his model on the following five assumptions about people that suggest ways organizations can motivate employees.²¹ Specifically, he captures the role that values and moral obligation play in work motivation.

1. “Humans are not only goal-oriented but also self-expressive.”²²

The most extreme expression of such behavior is self-sacrifice. Such extreme personally destructive acts can not be explained within the logic of instrumental or hedonistic motivation theories, but only in terms of a different logic in which the individual, by sacrificing himself, makes a statement about his identity and his relationship with a common cause. While the sacrifice of one’s life is not a common work behavior, many smaller sacrifices are regularly made by individuals in work roles.²³

2. “People are motivated to maintain and enhance their self-esteem and self-worth.”²⁴

Self-esteem is based on a sense of competence, power or achievement.
Self-worth is based on a sense of virtue and moral worth and is grounded in norms and values concerning conduct.^{25, 26}

²⁰ Sullivan, op. cit., p. 347.

²¹ Shamir.

²² Ibid., p. 412.

²³ Ibid., p. 411.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 413.

²⁵ Concerning the difference between self-esteem and self-worth: one can think of situations in which a person might have high self-esteem but low self-worth, and vice versa. A technically competent criminal lawyer who successfully defends a client he knows is guilty might have high self-esteem based on his competence, but low self-worth based on the knowledge deep down inside that he’s slime; a well-intentioned reformer who fails to achieve his goals might have high self-worth but low self-esteem.

²⁶ Shamir, p. 412.

. . . the theory will not apply equally to everyone, but that it will apply most to individuals who have strong values or more "crystallized" self-concepts . . .

3. "People are also motivated to retain and increase their sense of self-consistency."²⁷ Brockner *et al.* find empirical evidence for this in instances where individuals persist in pursuing courses of action they know are ineffective (for example, "throwing good money after bad"), because such actions are consistent with the individuals' self-images.²⁸
4. "Self-concepts are composed, in part, of identities."²⁹ People identify themselves with elements of society such as family, religion, culture, or organizations. The importance of any particular identity relative to others is called an individual's "identity salience" and is a source of motivation of activities that are congruent with that identity. Identities – such as "father," "Air Force officer," or "Little League coach" – and their relative importance fuel Leonard's model of the self-concept as well.³⁰
5. "Self-concept based behavior is not always related to clear expectations or to immediate and specific goals."³¹ That is, it can be related to peoples' dreams or to imagined futures. Nor may it be related to specific tasks or rewards. Shamir calls these situations "weak," where there are unclear or unspecified goals or reward-performance expectancies, as tends to be more the case in the public sector than in the private sector.³²

Based on these assumptions, Shamir makes five propositions that comprise the model at Figure 4-1. He admits the theory will not apply equally to everyone, but that it will apply most to individuals who have strong values or more "crystallized" self-concepts, such as those associated with levels of self-esteem.³³ The propositions are that motivation will increase when the following five conditions exist:

- Job-related identities are salient in the person's self-concept.
- The job offers opportunities for self-esteem enhancement.
- The job offers opportunities for increased self-worth.
- Actions required on the job are congruent with the person's self-concept or can be performed in a way that is consistent with the person's self-concept.
- Career attributes of the job are congruent with the person's possible selves.³⁴

²⁷ Ibid., p. 412.

²⁸ Joel Brockner, Robert Houser, Gregg Birnbaum, Kathy Lloyd, Janet Deitcher, Sinaia Nathanson and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Escalation of Commitment to an Ineffective Course of Action: The Effect of Feedback Having Negative Implications for Self-Identity," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (1986), pp. 109-126.

²⁹ Shamir, p. 413.

³⁰ Leonard *et al.*

³¹ Shamir, p. 413.

³² Ibid., p. 407.

³³ Ibid., p. 416.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 416.




Figure 4-1. Shamir's Self-concept Based Model of Nontask Intrinsic Motivation

Although Shamir indicates that it is through leadership that these conditions will best motivate behavior, he cautions that “a great deal of employee motivation may not be under [a] manager’s immediate control” because the meanings that influence employee behaviors “reflect social judgments and social values that originate, at least in part, outside the organizational system.”³⁵

Career Anchor Theory

Schein’s career anchor theory can be viewed as an expansion of Shamir’s fifth proposition regarding the “career attributes” of a job and how well they fit the individual. Schein says that individuals view careers differently than organizations do, so that typical organizational career paths may have little relevance for individuals planning their careers. He proposes that individuals typically go through distinct major stages of development vis-à-vis their careers over their work lives. During a process of self-discovery early in their work lives, they develop *career anchors* based on their perceptions of their own talents, skills, competencies, motives, drives, and values.

. . . individuals typically go through distinct major stages of development vis-à-vis their careers over their work lives.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 420.

Schein defines a *career anchor* as “that element in our self-concept that we will not give up, even if forced to make a different choice;” he says that the “self-image . . . can remain remarkably stable even if there is no opportunity to exercise it.”³⁶

Schein’s research³⁷ identified five anchors (he added three more later based on the subsequent research of others); each implies certain management practices relating to type of work, pay and benefits, promotion systems, and types of recognition. Table 4-3 summarizes Schein’s posited relationships. The data for the last three anchors are sparse because there have been few empirical studies about them.

According to Schein, individuals vary so widely that it is ultimately up to the individual to design his or her own career. Leaders or managers in organizations can do three things to help:

1. Create more flexible career paths, incentive systems, and reward systems to meet a wider range of individual needs, even within a particular job category.
2. Stimulate more self-insight and self-management, starting with themselves; that is, analyze their own career anchors, manage their own careers more actively, and only then ask their subordinates to do the same.
3. Be clearer about what the organization needs from the individual.³⁸

As is discussed in detail in the next section, Derr found evidence of career anchors among Naval officers. Another researcher, Barth, evaluated data from six Federal employee surveys and deduced the career-anchor orientation of Federal workers to the extent possible from the studies, which were originally conducted for other purposes. He found support for the theory and potential for public sector managers; in addition, he proposed an anchor unique to public sector employees: a “public service motive.”³⁹

³⁶ Edgar H. Schein, “Individuals and Careers” in *Handbook of Organizational Behavior*, Jay W. Lorsch (ed.), (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 158.

³⁷ A 1960s study of 44 alumni of the Sloan School of Management.

³⁸ Schein, p. 170.

³⁹ Thomas J. Barth, “Career Anchor Theory,” *Review of Public Administration* (Fall 1993), p. 39.

Table 4-3. Career Anchor/Management Implications Matrix

CAREER ANCHOR	MANAGEMENT AREA			
	WORK	PAY & BENEFITS	PROMOTION	RECOGNITION
Security	<i>stable, predictable; extrinsic rewards matter more</i>	<i>steady, predictable increments based on longevity</i>	<i>seniority based; published grade or rank system & timing</i>	<i>loyalty and steady performance</i>
Autonomy/ Independence	<i>dislikes others' rules, procedures, hours, dress codes; likes clear goals, left on own to achieve</i>	<i>merit pay for performance; immediate payoffs, bonuses; portable/cafeteria benefits</i>	<i>reflects past performance; gives greater freedom, or autonomy; not necessarily greater responsibility</i>	<i>portable (medals, testimonials, letters of commendation, prizes, awards)</i>
Technical/ Functional	<i>challenging; focuses on the intrinsic content; will participate in goal-setting; wants autonomy in execution</i>	<i>according to skill/education/work experience; oriented to "external equity;" absolute pay level rather than incentives; portable benefits</i>	<i>professional promotional ladder that parallels managerial ladder; need not be in terms of rank</i>	<i>values professional peer recognition; opportunities for self-development</i>
Managerial	<i>needs mixture of skills in analytic, emotional, and interpersonal competence; values work that identifies strongly with success of the organization</i>	<i>oriented toward internal equity; measures success by income level; highly portable benefits</i>	<i>based on merit, measured performance, results</i>	<i>rank, title, salary, number of subordinates, size of budget; frequent promotions; movement; status symbols</i>
Entrepreneurial	<i>easily bored; requires constant new challenges</i>	<i>ownership is the most important issue; benefits not meaningful</i>	<i>power and freedom to move into any roles that meet needs; positions that permit exercise of creativity</i>	<i>highly personal visibility and public recognition</i>
Service	<i>works toward important values; permits realizing essential values</i>	<i>fair pay and portable benefits</i>	<i>recognizes contributions; confers freedom, influence, and autonomy</i>	<i>support from peers and superiors who share values</i>
Challenge	<i>faces perpetually tougher challenges; winning is everything; needs opportunities for self-testing; to exercise competitive skills. Example: Naval aviators</i>			
Lifestyle	<i>balanced personal and professional life; wants flexibility above all; example: dual-career couples</i>	<i>intrinsic rewards important; flexible working conditions, benefits</i>		<i>understanding from managers</i>

Military Applications

Reward/motivation framework. Motowidlo and Van Scotter's 1994 study of 421 Air Force mechanics supports the general construct, presented at the beginning of this report, of distinguishing between task- and nontask motivation. They found evidence that both *task* performance and *contextual* performance provide statistically significant contributions to supervisors' perceptions of the mechanics' overall performance.⁴⁰ *Task performance* refers to activities that directly execute, maintain, or service the organization's technical requirements, such as operating machinery in a plant, performing surgery in a hospital, or replenishing supplies. *Contextual performance* behaviors, on the other hand, "support the broader organizational, social and psychological environment in which the technical core must function."⁴¹ These would include Organ's organizational citizenship behaviors.⁴²

Self-concept based theory/deontic theory. Both Shamir's self-concept based theory and Schwartz deontic theory focus on explaining a general work or job motivation that may be characterized as *commitment* and *self-sacrifice*.⁴³ The military services believe these same concepts are important enough to term them core values – service interviewees and published documents include "commitment," "selfless service," "service above self," or "patriotism and selflessness" as core values in the




Figure 4-2. "Shamir" Model Adapted to Military Service

⁴⁰ Stephan J. Motowidlo and James R. Van Scotter, "Evidence That Task Performance Should Be Distinguished From Contextual Performance," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (1994), pp. 001-006.

⁴¹ Motowidlo and Van Scotter, p. 002.

⁴² Organ.

⁴³ Shamir.

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, respectively.⁴⁴ The theories help explain *why* and *how* these values can motivate individual performance (Figure 4-2).

The U.S. Marine Corps boot camp experience shows the power of self-based motivation. A reporter from *The Wall Street Journal*, through interviews with boot camp participants and their families, found that the boot camp experience imprints the USMC cultural values in individuals.⁴⁵ Recruits take on the Marine Corps' core values – Honor, Courage, Commitment – and the transformation is so pronounced that when the trainees return to their families and former friends, they no longer identify with them, their lifestyles, or their values. The boot camp experience transforms an “individual” focus to a “team” focus; pursuit of “self-gratification” to “self-discipline;” and an orientation toward “pleasure” to one toward “sacrifice.” Comments of the participants reflect their new cultural orientation: “Society needs to be straightened out,” and “Marine Corps *discipline* is about *brotherhood*.”⁴⁶ From this picture, it appears the USMC does a good job of fostering nontask intrinsic motivation by melding the identity of its members with that of the organization. In terms of Shamir's model, their “identity salience” is strongly with the Marine Corps; self-esteem and self-worth are enhanced by training and by alignment of their personal values with Marine Corps values. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests the transformation is lasting – “once a Marine, always a Marine.”

Career Anchor Theory. In 1979, Derr completed a study of Naval personnel that involved 154 interviews and questionnaires. The data enabled Derr to categorize Naval officers according to Schein's five (at that time) career anchors. The data show the presence of all five anchors, as well as considerable variation among subspecialties. For example, Table 4-4 shows that 63 percent of aviators had technical anchors and 24 percent had managerial anchors; among surface officers the percentages are reversed. Table 4-5 shows variations within both the aviator and submariner subspecialties.

Table 4-4. Career Anchors of Naval Officers

ANCHOR	PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS					
	N=124 ALL OFFICERS	N=50 AVIATORS	N=19 SURFACE	N=21 SUBMARINE	N=12 CEC	N=22 SUPPLY
<i>Managerial</i>	33.9	24.0	62.2	36.0	16.6	56.5
<i>Security</i>	15.3	10.0	10.5	21.0	24.0	22.7
<i>Technical</i>	36.3	63.0	21.0	36.0	24.0	14.2
<i>Autonomy</i>	4.0	0	0	0	32.3	4.5
<i>Creativity</i>	10.4	3.0	6.2	7.0	3.0	2.0

⁴⁴ See, for example, Army FM 100-1; and Army People Vision, ASA(M&RA), March, 1994. Interviewees included the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Navy and Air Force Academy officials (8th QPMC, 1995).

⁴⁵ “New Marines Illustrate Growing Gap Between Military and Society,” *The Wall Street Journal*, Wednesday, July 26, 1995.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Table 4-5. Career Anchors of Aviators and Submariners

ANCHOR	PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS						
	AVIATORS				SUBMARINERS		
	N=14 FIGHTERS	N=13 ATTACKS	N=13 HELICOPTERS	N=14 MULTI-ENGINE	N=15 SSN FAST ATTACK	N=12 SSBN MISSILE	N=8 NON-NUCLEAR
<i>Managerial</i>	30.8	16.6	33.3	15.4	52.6	30.0	20.0
<i>Security</i>	7.6	33.3	0	0	15.8	50.0	20.0
<i>Technical</i>	61.6	50.0	66.6	77.0	31.6	20.0	60.0
<i>Autonomy</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Creativity</i>	0	0	0	7.6	0	0	0

Derr found evidence to support another type of career anchor, that of “warrior,” which Schein subsequently included in his expanded list as “challenge.” Derr characterizes warriors by their need for action and adventure, by their need for espousing values such as patriotism, by pride in their competence, and by their desire to “carry out a dangerous mission with success dependent on their skill.” They may combine technical and entrepreneurial skills with a “high need for autonomy” and “putting their lives on the line is critical.” They usually “fear being promoted beyond the action; they especially fear staff positions.”⁴⁷

Derr further modified Schein’s original classifications to better fit the Navy personnel. He interviewed by subdividing the managerial anchor into two categories, adding “identity affiliation” and subdividing creativity into two categories. The first managerial type is “upwardly mobile,” which is oriented toward “power, influence and control.”⁴⁸ In contrast, the “evolving manager” is less concerned with organizational politics than with simply doing a good job at whatever stage of the organization he or she finds himself, learning and preparing for future stages while enjoying each career phase as it occurs. The identity-affiliation anchor describes those who are there primarily for their attachment to the organization and its esprit de corps, and for the camaraderie and interpersonal relationships they enjoy. Individuals with the creative anchor were either “growth oriented,” channeling their creative urges into personal development, or “entrepreneurial,” high-achieving, goal-oriented risk-takers. Derr classified his sample according to this scheme, as shown in Table 4-6. Note again that all anchors are present. If, as Schein avers, people with different anchors are motivated by different human resource management practices,⁴⁹ then the implication is serious: Navy officers are in a system that does not provide them full opportunity for intrinsic rewards.

⁴⁷ C. Brooklyn Derr, “More on Career Anchor Concepts: The Case of U.S. Naval Officers” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School) (NPS54-79-007), 1979, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Derr, p.17.

⁴⁹ For example, look again at Table 4-3. For the “Security” anchor, the descriptions under “Pay and Benefits” and “Promotion” describe the current military system, as does the description of “Recognition” for the “Managerial” anchor. Conversely, the “Work” and “Promotion” descriptions for the “Autonomy” and “Technical” anchors, respectively, do not describe the present military system.

Table 4-6. Derr's Career Anchors of Naval Officers

CAREER ANCHOR	PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS
<i>Upwardly Mobile Manager</i>	12
<i>Evolving Manager</i>	20
<i>Technical</i>	22
<i>Security</i>	7
<i>Identity Affiliation</i>	8
<i>Autonomy</i>	4
<i>Growth-Oriented Creativity</i>	8
<i>Entrepreneurial Creativity</i>	11
<i>Warrior</i>	8

Nonegoistic Behavior. Frank demonstrates that it is necessary to take into account altruism and like kinds of motivation in order to explain some observed behaviors and that it is consistent with the economic assumption of “rational man” to do so.⁵⁰ He shows that it makes sense for a person to take into account the values and beliefs of other individuals affected by his or her decisions. One example Frank uses to illustrate his point has a player making an offer to share \$50 with another player. If the other player accepts the offer, the two split the \$50 in the proportions the offeror has specified. If the other player declines the offer, neither gets anything and the game is never repeated. Frank says that knowledge of how the other player may react to an “unfair” split of the \$50 will influence the offeror’s offer. Thus, the values of the other person influence the behavior of the offeror.

Frank does not address the influence of the offeror’s *own* values, but it is easy to infer that they might similarly affect the offeror’s behavior. For example, the offeror may offer to keep \$40 and give the other person \$10; both would clearly be better off if the offer were accepted. But it is likely that if *either* the offeror or the other person had a strong sense of “fairness,” the offeror might offer a 50/50 split.

This analysis may suggest why rewards by themselves might not induce the behavior that is intended. That is, *how* the rewards are given could also be important. For example, a soldier might object to being paid more to endure some unpleasant conditions because it makes him or her a “mercenary” creature or, perhaps even more importantly, his or her peers will begin to view him or her that way – a view that may conflict with his or her self-concept. In contrast, the soldier might prefer, and respond positively to, the removal, mediation, or even just the recognition of those unpleasant conditions instead of the extra pay. An implication of this reasoning is that if “equity” is an ingrained value of military members, then resistance to incentive or other pays that disturb the existing balance of rewards might be high.

⁵⁰ Robert Frank, *Microeconomics and Behavior* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1994).

The Military “X-Factor”

Background. The military factor, or X-factor, is an explanation of why the pay required to attract and retain a military member might be higher than that required by a private-sector company for a civilian in an identical, but nonmilitary, job. Some foreign armed services, such as those of Australia and the United Kingdom, use an explicit X-factor in calculating military pay. Their methodology is to first compare military and private sector jobs to obtain a “comparable” pay; they then add the X-factor adjustment to arrive at military pay. A constant X-factor value is typically applied across wide ranges of grades. Thus, the X-factor is “an addition to basic pay . . . in order to reflect the difference between conditions of service experienced by members of the armed forces over a full career and conditions in civilian life, which can not be taken directly into account when assessing pay comparability,”⁵¹ and “a broad recognition that a serviceman’s employment and lifestyle are substantially different from those of a civilian.”⁵²

Both the First and Third QRMCs examined the need for an explicit X-factor payment, but neither recommended it. The First QRMC determined that all of the differences between military and civilian life for which compensation might be justified can be done so via “elements of pay other than salary” and that “the distinctions should not therefore affect the linkage of military salaries with civilian salaries.”⁵³

The Third QRMC was “tasked by the Secretary of Defense to recognize that the unique conditions of military service may require unique forms of compensation.”⁵⁴ Of eleven unique conditions of military service that the Third QRMC found, six were thought to be so “unquantifiable in any reasonable way” that only the following five were “amenable to compensation:”

- Combat exposure (two levels),
- Frequent directed moves, including overseas assignments,
- Unlimited and irregular overtime without pay, and
- Field training and equivalent training at sea from home port.

A Third QRMC staff paper detailed a comprehensive model to compute X-factor values, based on extensive input data. However, the calculation is inherently very subjective. As a result the staff paper recommended that “the General Military Factor be compensated for by an X Factor in total military compensation above the levels required to achieve total compensation parity for work level comparability with [the]

⁵¹ Ministry of Defence (1), Review Body on Armed Forces Pay: Twenty-Fourth Report, (United Kingdom: HMSO, 1995), p. 7.

⁵² Ministry of Defence (2), “Managing People in Tomorrow’s Armed Forces,” Independent Review of the Armed Forces’ Manpower, Career and Remuneration Structures, (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 50.

⁵³ Department of Defense (2), Modernizing Military Pay: The Report of the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (Vol. II, Appendix VI, Tab D), (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 168.

⁵⁴ Department of Defense (4), “The Military Factor,” in *Military Compensation: A Modernized System*. The Report and Staff Studies of the Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (Vol. III, Tab H), (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 44.

civilian sector of the economy,” and that it be set between 4.4 percent and 15 percent of the military equivalent salary.⁵⁵ The staff paper recommendation was not adopted by the Third QRMC.

Instead, the Third QRMC recommended that the military factor be recognized in compensation at two levels: the general and the individual. They argued that commissary, exchange, and medical benefits compensate military members for the general level of the military factor and should therefore be retained at then-current levels. At the individual level, special and incentive pays exist to compensate military members for the military factor. Thus, the Third QRMC recognized the existence of unique conditions of military service as influences on compensation, but it concluded that the current system contains adequate provision for these conditions.⁵⁶

Discussion. The intrinsic-extrinsic and task-nontask framework helps us to see where military compensation fits into the broader picture. It seems obvious that all four kinds of compensation work together to balance the supply and demand of individuals for the uniformed services. The X-factor methodology takes some of this into account but ignores others. A more thorough approach might require, for example, explicitly considering whether jobs could be improved through redesign, or whether careers should be redesigned to be more fulfilling to a wider variety of service members before resorting to pay changes. This makes sense, given that there is little evidence linking *pay* to performance, let alone anything else. Why not instead employ some cogent motivational theory in a more comprehensive approach to motivating service members?

The Third QRMC’s exhaustive study of the X-factor provided solid support that one might reasonably expect the pay of military members to be higher than the pay of civilians in comparable jobs. But, given the difficulties in quantifying *either* the civilian pay for a comparable job or the X-factor, the *de facto* approach the Department of Defense has taken – via labor market-determined levels of relevant special and incentive pays – is probably best.⁵⁷ In the future, relatively low-cost, theory-based, empirically informed improvements to military human resource management might be the most effective approaches to change.

The intrinsic-extrinsic and task-nontask framework helps us to see where military compensation fits into the broader picture.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 46.

⁵⁶ Department of Defense (3), “Report of the Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation” in Military Compensation: A Modernized System. The Report and Staff Studies of the Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (Vol. 1, Tab A) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

⁵⁷ Also, consider what Department of Defense has done at times in response to the “pay gap.” The military pay raises in 1980 and 1981, for instance, were differentially applied (namely, they were not constant across all pay grades) and were deemed to have restored comparability to the 1972 levels necessary to maintain an all-volunteer force. Department of Defense (1), Military Compensation Background Papers (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991).

Recommendations

We have three broad recommendations for the Department of Defense:

- Support behavioral research oriented toward informing policy decisions on human resource management. Topics suggested by this study of nontask intrinsic motivation include research to identify the variety and prevalence of career anchors among military personnel, the strength of “identities” among service personnel, and the current and desired roles of “contextual” performance in the military.
- Teach a deeper understanding of intrinsic motivation and its sources to leaders and managers. Test alternative appraisal concepts as tools for managers to use to learn more about the motivational potential of their own leadership styles.
- In future policy decisions, explicitly consider the potential of each possible type of compensation – task-nontask and intrinsic-extrinsic – to motivate behavior. Develop sets of policy options that include measures aimed at all four forms of compensation.

